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Abstract
This paper is devoted to systematic studies of some extensions of first-
order Go¨del logic. The first extension is the first-order rational Go¨del logic
which is an extension of first-order Go¨del logic, enriched by countably
many nullary logical connectives. By introducing some suitable seman-
tics and proof theory, it is shown that the first-order rational Go¨del logic
has the completeness property, that is any (strongly) consistent theory is
satisfiable. Furthermore, two notions of entailment and strong entailment
are defined and their relations with the corresponding notion of proof is
studied. In particular, an approximate entailment-compactness is shown.
Next, by adding a binary predicate symbol d to the first-order rational
Go¨del logic, the ultrametric logic is introduced. This serves as a suitable
framework for analyzing structures which carry an ultrametric function d
together with some functions and predicates which are uniformly contin-
uous with respect to the ultrametric d. Some model theory is developed
and to justify the relevance of this model theory, the Robinson joint con-
sistency theorem is proven.
Keywords: First-order Go¨del logic, Continuous metric logic, Ultramet-
ric logic, Robinson consistency theorem
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1 Introduction
The goal of this paper is twofold. On one hand, we are aiming to study some
logical aspects of extensions of first-order Go¨del logic and on the other hand,
to introduce an alternative framework for (continuous) metric logic. The fuzzy
logic is a branch of mathematical logic dealing with systematic studies of logi-
cal aspects of different types of many-valued logics, whose main emphasis rely
mostly on introducing a relevant semantics for a given many-valued logic, ex-
ploring a (complete) set of axiomatic system and ultimately proving some kind
of completeness results [10, 1]. The  Lukasiewicz and Go¨del logics [14, 6, 2, 8, 11]
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are two important examples of fuzzy logics. The BL-algebras serve as the most
general form of the set of truth values for different types of fuzzy logic [10].
However, in many important cases such as  Lukasiewicz logic, it suffices to con-
sider the standard truth valued set [0, 1]. The semantics based on this set is
called the standard semantics. If one considers the compact Euclidian topology
on [0, 1], then one of the distinguished characters of the  Lukasiewicz logic as
well as its extension Pavelka logic is that all the logical connectives including
implication are continuous functions. This simple but fundamental fact implies
some of the important results including the Pavelka style completeness theorem
for standard semantics of these logics [13, 10].
The starting step of this paper is to study the first-order rational Go¨del logic.
The relevance of this extension to Go¨del logic is the same as the rational Pavelka
logic to  Lukasiewicz logic. To accomplish our goal, the first-order Go¨del logic is
enriched by countably many nullary connectives which are naturally interpreted
by the rational numbers in the truth value set [0, 1] [9]. There are some major
differences between the rational Go¨del logic and Pavelka logic. The first major
difference is that the standard semantics should be replaced by some ”non-
standard” semantics. For this, one should first consider the set I = [0, 1]2 \
{(0, r) : r > 0} which is the set of truth values in rational Go¨del logic. So, in
this logic, the predicates are interpreted in the set I. Secondly, the lack of the
continuity of logical connectives with respect to the order topology on the set of
truth values, which causes the loss of Pavelka style completeness of this logic.
The second step of this paper is to choose an alternative setting to extend
the ideas from (continuous) metric logic to the first-order rational Go¨del logic.
A common trend in the current development of model theoretic investigations
is to implement the logical ideas with an eye towards interesting mathematical
structures. (Continuous) Metric logic [5, 3, 4, 7] aims to extend this new trend
of model theory to a class of mathematical structures, which naturally arose in
analysis. This research pass has already shed a new light on current studies in
model theory. The logical formalism in which this model theory is based on is an
important instant of many-valued logic, namely  Lukasiewicz logic [12, 14, 6, 2,
7, 13]. Loosely speaking, a metric structure in this logic consists of a (complete)
metric space (M,d : X×X → [0, 1]) together with some additional relations and
functions which are uniformly continuous with respect to the metric function d.
In this sense, the (continuous) metric logic is the model theory of (complete)
metric structures.
The starting point in (continuous) metric logic relies heavily on this fact
as how to modify the  Lukasiewicz logic with the standard semantics so that
the ”fuzzy” interpretation of the equality relation coincides with the notion of
metric [5].
An important subclass of metric spaces consists of ultrametric spaces. Recall
that a metric space (M,d) is an ultrametric if it satisfies a stronger form of the
triangle inequality in which for any a, b, c ∈M ,
d(a, b) ≤ max(d(a, c), d(c, b)).
So, in particular, an ultrametric structure can be defined in a similar fashion as
above. In this sense, these structures can also be studied within the (continuous)
metric logic.
If one modifies the Go¨del logic in the same way as  Lukasiewicz logic, the
interpretation of the equality predicate coincides with the notion of ultramet-
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ric. That is why one may believe this is a natural approach towards studying
ultrametric structures. To emphasize on this natural approach, this new logic
is called the ultrametric logic.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section is devoted to study
the first-order rational Go¨del logic. First, by defining a suitable semantic
and giving an axiomatization system, it is shown that the first-order rational
Go¨del logic satisfies that completeness theorem (Theorem 2.20). Then, two
notions of entailment and strong entailment are discussed and their connections
to the corresponding notion of proof are explored. In particular, it is proven
that the first-order rational Go¨del logic satisfies the approximate entailment
compactness (Theorem 2.24).
The third and fourth sections include the key notion of ultrametric logic
and some model theoretic machineries developed for proving the Robinson joint
consistency theorem for this logic (Theorem 4.15).
The paper is concluded by given some guidelines as how to proceed this
research further in order to explore the relevance of this logic for understanding
the interesting mathematic structures.
2 Rational Go¨del Logic
In this section the first-order rational Go¨del logic is given. The syntactical
issues of this logic is the same as the usual first-order Go¨del logic. However, the
semantical aspects which is given here are somewhat different from the usual
approach if fuzzy logic. Opposite to the usual conventions in fuzzy logic, the
nullary connective 0¯ is assumed as the absolute truth, while 1¯ as the absolute
falsity. Moreover a formula is satisfied in a model M if its interpretation in
M is zero. This approach is taken from the (continuous) metric logic and will
be justified when the ultrametric logic is introduced. Furthermore, it would be
very easy to see that all of the results in this section can be translated to usual
semantical approach in (fuzzy) first-order Go¨del logic.
Throughout this paper, suppose L is a first-order language with count-
ably many predicate, function and constant symbols. As usual, we also as-
sume a countable set of variables together with the set of boolean connectives
{∨,∧,→,¬, 0¯, 1¯} and the set of quantifiers {∀, ∃}. The rational Go¨del logic
RGL∗ is obtained by extending the set of nullary connectives {0¯, 1¯} with the
set A = {r¯ : r ∈ [0, 1]Q = Q∩ [0, 1]} of nullary connectives. The corresponding
notions of L-terms, (atomic) L-formulas and subformulas are defined as usual.
In particular, the notion of free variables, bound variables and sentences, i.e.,
formulas without free variables are considered as classical first-order logic. The
set of L-formulas and L-sentences are denoted by Form(L) and Sent(L), re-
spectively. For an L-formula ϕ, Sub(ϕ) is the set of subformulas of ϕ. An
L-theory is an arbitrary set of L-sentences.
Below, the semantical aspects of RGL∗ are introduced. Unlike the standard
semantics, the set I = [0, 1]2 \ {(0, r) : r > 0} with the lexicographical ordering
is taken as the set of truth values, since as otherwise the compactness theorem
fails if the standard set of truth values [0, 1] is assumed. For simplicity, we use
the notation rˆ instead of (r, r) ∈ I.
Definition 2.1. An L-structure M is a nonempty set M called the universe of
M together with:
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a) for any n-ary predicate symbol P of L, a function PM :Mn → I,
b) for any n-ary function symbol f of L, a function fM :Mn →M ,
c) for any constant symbol c of L, an element cM in the universe of M.
For each α ∈ L, αM is called the interpretation of α in M.
An M-assignment of variables is a function σ from the set of variables into
the set M . The interpretation of L-terms is defined as follows.
Definition 2.2. Let M and σ be as above and let x¯ = (x1...xn). Then, for
every term t(x¯),
1. if t(x¯) = xi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, then tM,σ(x¯) = σ(xi),
2. if t(x¯) = c then tM,σ(x¯) = cM,
3. if t(x¯) = f(t1(x¯), ..., tn(x¯)) then t
M,σ(x¯) = fM(tM,σ1 (x¯), ..., t
M,σ
n (x¯)).
The interpretation of L-formulas inside an L-structure M is defined as fol-
lows.
Definition 2.3. Let M be an L-structure and σ be an M-assignment.
1. for every r¯ ∈ A, r¯M,σ = rˆ. Particularly, 1¯M,σ = 1ˆ and 0¯M,σ = 0ˆ.
2. PM,σ(t1(x¯), ..., tn(x¯)) = P
M(tM,σ1 (x¯), ..., t
M,σ
n (x¯)).
3. (ϕ ∧ ψ)M,σ(x¯) = max{ϕM,σ(x¯), ψM,σ(x¯)}.
4. (ϕ→ ψ)M,σ(x¯) =
{
0 ϕM,σ(x¯) ≥ ψM,σ(x¯),
ψM,σ(x¯) ϕM,σ(x¯) < ψM,σ(x¯).
5. (∀x ϕ(x))M,σ = sup{ϕM,σ
′
(x) : σ(x) = σ′(x)}.
6. (∃x ϕ(x))M,σ = inf{ϕM,σ
′
(x) : σ(x) = σ′(x)}.
Note that 5 and 6 are well-defined, since I is a complete ordered set, i.e., any
subset of I has the least upper bound and the greatest lower bound, respectively.
The following connectives ¬,∨,↔,⇒ are given in terms of the above con-
nectives.
¬ϕ := ϕ→ 1¯.
ϕ ∨ ψ := ((ϕ→ ψ)→ ψ) ∧ ((ψ → ϕ)→ ϕ).
ϕ↔ ψ := (ϕ→ ψ) ∧ (ψ → ϕ).
ϕ⇒ ψ := (ψ → ϕ)→ ψ.
Hence, their interpretations can be accordingly computed. In particular,
(ϕ ∨ ψ)M,σ(x¯) = min{ϕM,σ(x¯), ψM,σ(x¯)},
(ϕ↔ ψ)M,σ(x¯) = dmax(ϕM,σ(x¯), ψM,σ(x¯)),
where
dmax(x, y) =
{
max{x, y} x 6= y,
0ˆ x = y.
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Observe that if ψM,σ(x¯) > 0ˆ then (ϕ⇒ ψ)M,σ(x¯) = 0ˆ iff ϕM,σ(x¯) > ψM,σ(x¯).
Therefore, (ϕ(x¯)⇒ r¯)M,σ = 0ˆ for r > 0 iff ϕM,σ(x¯) > rˆ.
When ϕ(x¯) is a quantifier free L-formula, ϕM,σ(x¯) is dependent only on
σ(x¯). Thus, if σ(x¯) = a¯ ∈Mn we may write ϕM(a¯) instead of ϕM,σ(x¯). If ϕ is
an L-sentence we write ϕM for ϕM,σ.
Definition 2.4. Let M be an L-structure. For an L-formula ϕ(x¯) and an
L-theory T ,
1. ϕ(x¯) is satisfied by a¯ ∈ M if ϕM(a¯) = 0ˆ. In this situation, we write
M |= ϕ(a¯). T is satisfiable in M, if M |= ψ for every ψ ∈ T . This is
denoted by M |= T .
2. For an L-sentence ϕ, we say that T entails ϕ, T |= ϕ, if for any L-
structure M |= T , M |= ϕ.
3. Likewise, T strongly entails ϕ, T
s
|= ϕ, if for any structure M, ϕM ≤
sup{ψM : ψ ∈ T }.
T is called a satisfiable L-theory if there is an L-structure M |= T . T is a
finitely satisfiable theory if every finite subset of T is satisfiable.
2.1 Axioms and the Proof System
This subsection is devoted to introducing a complete proof system for RGL∗.
The first part of axioms of RGL∗ are the axioms of propositional Go¨del logic
[10].
(G1) (ϕ→ ψ)→ ((ψ → χ)→ (ϕ→ χ)).
(G2) (ϕ ∧ ψ)→ ϕ.
(G3) (ϕ ∧ ψ)→ (ψ ∧ ϕ).
(G4) ϕ→ (ϕ ∧ ϕ).
(G5) (ϕ→ (ψ → χ))↔ ((ϕ ∧ ψ)→ χ).
(G6) ((ϕ→ ψ)→ χ)→ (((ψ → ϕ)→ χ)→ χ).
(G7) 1¯→ ϕ.
The following axioms state the properties of the quantifiers ∀ and ∃.
(G∀1) (∀xϕ(x))→ ϕ(t) (t substitutable for x in ϕ(x)).
(G∀2)
(
∀x (ψ → ϕ(x))
)
→
(
ψ → (∀xϕ(x))
)
(x not free in ψ).
(G∀3)
(
∀x (ψ ∨ ϕ(x))
)
→
(
ψ ∨ (∀xϕ(x))
)
(x not free in ψ).
(G∃1) ϕ(t)→ (∃xϕ(x)) (t substitutable for x in ϕ(x)).
(G∃2)
(
∃x (ψ → ϕ(x))
)
→
(
ψ → (∃xϕ(x))
)
(x not free in ψ).
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The inference rules are modus ponens and generalization:
ϕ, ϕ→ ψ
ψ
,
ϕ
∀xϕ
.
The notion of proof is defined as usual. When an L-theory T proves an L-
sentence ϕ, we denote it by T ⊢ ϕ. T is called consistent if T 0 1¯. Otherwise,
it is inconsistent. The deduction theorem is stated as follows.
Theorem 2.5. T ∪ {ϕ} ⊢ ψ iff T ⊢ ϕ→ ψ.
Proof. See [10, Theorem 2.2.18]
An L-theory T is linear complete if for every pair of sentences (ϕ, ψ), either
T ⊢ ϕ→ ψ or T ⊢ ψ → ϕ.
Lemma 2.6. (Substitution lemma) Let Γ be an L-theory and R,S be two nullary
predicate symbols. Moreover, suppose Γ(R,S) ⊢ χ(R,S). Then, for every L-
sentences ϕ and ψ, Γ(ϕ, ψ) ⊢ χ(ϕ, ψ).
Proof. Straightforward using the notion of proof.
Lemma 2.7. Suppose that T is an L-theory and ϕ, ψ, χ ∈ Sent(L). Then,
(i) ⊢ ϕ→ (ψ → ϕ).
(ii) ⊢ ϕ→ (ψ → (ϕ ∧ ψ)).
(iii) ⊢ (0¯→ ϕ)→ ϕ.
(iv) If T ⊢ ϕ and T ⊢ ψ then T ⊢ ϕ ∧ ψ.
(v) If T ⊢ ϕ→ ψ and T ⊢ ψ → χ then T ⊢ ϕ→ χ.
(vi) ⊢
(
(ϕ→ ψ)→ (ψ → ϕ)
)
→ (ψ → ϕ).
(vii) ⊢ ϕ→ (ϕ ∨ ψ).
(viii) ⊢
(
(ϕ→ ψ)→ χ
)
→
(
(ψ → ϕ) ∨ χ
)
.
Proof. (i)-(vii) are obvious, [10, Chapter 2]. For (viii), by G6,
⊢
(
(ϕ→ ψ)→ χ
)
→
((
(ψ → ϕ)→ χ
)
→ χ
)
.
So, by modus ponens,
(ϕ→ ψ)→ χ ⊢
(
(ψ → ϕ)→ χ
)
→ χ. (1)
On the other hand, by G1,
⊢
(
(ϕ→ ψ)→ χ
)
→
((
χ→ (ψ → ϕ)
)
→
(
(ϕ→ ψ)→ (ψ → ϕ)
))
.
Therefore, by modus ponens,
(ϕ→ ψ)→ χ ⊢
(
χ→ (ψ → ϕ)
)
→
(
(ϕ→ ψ)→ (ψ → ϕ)
)
.
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Now, by (vi) and using (v), we have
(ϕ→ ψ)→ χ ⊢
(
χ→ (ψ → ϕ)
)
→ (ψ → ϕ). (2)
Now, by (1), (2) and using (iv), we have
(ϕ→ ψ)→ χ ⊢
((
χ→ (ψ → ϕ)
)
→ (ψ → ϕ)
)
∧
((
(ψ → ϕ)→ χ
)
→ χ
)
.
Thus, by definition of ∨,
(ϕ→ ψ)→ χ ⊢ (ψ → ϕ) ∨ χ.
Other axioms of RGL∗ called the book-keeping axioms, that is for any r¯, s¯ ∈
A,
(RGL1) r¯ ∧ s¯↔ max{r, s},
(RGL2)
{
r¯→ s¯ if r ≥ s,
(r¯ → s¯)↔ s¯ if r < s,
(RGL3) ¬¬r¯, for all r < 1.
The following fact is used in the proof of the completeness theorem and its proof
can be found in [10, Chapter 2].
Lemma 2.8. Let T be an L-theory.
1) Let ∼ be the relation on Sent(L) defined by
ϕ ∼ ψ if and only if T ⊢ ϕ↔ ψ.
Then, ∼ is an equivalence relation.
2) Let G = {[ϕ]T : ϕ ∈ Sent(L)} be the set of equivalence classes of ∼.
Define ≤G on G by
[ϕ]T ≤G [ψ]T iff T ⊢ ψ → ϕ.
Then, ≤G defines a partially order relation on G.
3) For any r¯ ∈ A, suppose rG = [r¯]T . Assume
.∨, .∧ and .→ are given by
[ϕ]T
.∨ [ψ]T = [ϕ ∨ ψ]T ,
[ϕ]T .∧ [ψ]T = [ϕ ∧ ψ]T ,
[ϕ]T
.→ [ψ]T = [ϕ→ ψ]T ,
respectively. Then, (G, .∨, .∧, .→, [0¯]T , [1¯]T ) is a resituated lattice with the
largest element [1¯]T and the least element [0¯]T where .∧ and
.→ form an
adjoint pair, i.e., for all a, b, c ∈ G,
a .∧ b ≥G c iff a ≥G b
.→ c.
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In some literatures, G is called a G-algebra and the structure (G, .∨, .∧, .→
, {[r¯]T : r ∈ [0, 1]Q}) is called an RGL-algebra.
The following crucial definition is needed for the completeness of RGL∗.
Definition 2.9. An L-theory T is called strongly consistent if T 0 r¯ for every
r > 0.
Clearly, if T is a strongly consistent theory then for each r > 0, we have
[r¯]T > [0¯]T . Furthermore, by RGL3, since for every r < 1, we have [r¯]T < [1¯]T .
Hence, the function r → [r¯]T defines an order isomorphism of [0, 1]Q onto {r
G :
r ∈ [0, 1]Q}.
Remark 2.10. Using the usual proof of soundness theorem, one may show that
if T ⊢ ϕ then T |= ϕ for every L-theory T and L-sentence ϕ.
2.2 Completeness of RGL∗
In this subsection, it is shown that any strongly consistent theory is satisfiable.
Consequently, the compactness theorem is proved. Our proof is based on Henkin
construction. First, some preliminary lemmas are given.
Lemma 2.11. Let T be a strongly consistent L-theory in RGL∗ and ϕ, ψ ∈
Sent(L). Then, either T ∪ {ϕ→ ψ} or T ∪ {ψ → ϕ} are strongly consistent.
Proof. Suppose on the contrary that both T ∪ {ϕ → ψ} and T ∪ {ψ → ϕ} are
not strongly consistent. So, there are r, s > 0 such that T ∪ {ϕ → ψ} ⊢ r¯
and T ∪ {ψ → ϕ} ⊢ s¯. Thus, by the deduction theorem, T ⊢ (ϕ → ψ) → r¯
and T ⊢ (ψ → ϕ) → s¯. Without loss of generality, we may suppose that
min{r, s} = r. Therefore, by RGL2, ⊢ s¯ → r¯. Now, using Lemma 2.7(v), we
have T ⊢ (ϕ→ ψ)→ r¯ and T ⊢ (ψ → ϕ)→ r¯. Hence, by G6, we have T ⊢ r¯, a
contradiction.
Next, the notion of maximally strongly consistent theory is defined.
Definition 2.12. A strongly consistent theory T is called maximally strongly
consistent if it can not be properly included in any strongly consistent theory,
i.e., for any strongly consistent theory Σ, if T ⊆ Σ then T = Σ.
Lemma 2.13. Let T be a strongly consistent L-theory. T is maximally strongly
consistent if and only if
1. for all ϕ, ψ ∈ Sent(L), either ϕ→ ψ ∈ T or ψ → ϕ ∈ T ,
2. if ϕ ∈ Sent(L) and T ⊢ r¯ → ϕ for all r > 0, then ϕ ∈ T .
Proof. (1) is easily derived from Lemma 2.11. For (2), let T ⊢ r¯ → ϕ for all
r > 0. We show that T ∪ {ϕ} is strongly consistent. Suppose on the contrary,
T∪{ϕ} is not strongly consistent. Then, there is k > 0 such that T∪{ϕ} ⊢ k. So,
by the deduction theorem, T ⊢ ϕ→ k¯. Hence, using Lemma 2.7(v), T ⊢ r¯ → k¯
for all r > 0. In particular, if we take r < k we get a contradiction.
Conversely, let (1) and (2) hold and Σ be a strongly consistent theory containing
T . If ϕ /∈ T then it implies there exists r > 0 such that T 0 r¯ → ϕ. So,
ϕ→ r¯ ∈ T and therefore, ϕ→ r¯ ∈ Σ. Thus, ϕ /∈ Σ.
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Now, an easy application of Zorn’s lemma ensures the existence of a maxi-
mally strongly consistent extension of every strongly consistent theory. Hence,
the following lemma is established.
Lemma 2.14. There exists a maximally strongly consistent extension of every
strongly consistent theory.
Lemma 2.15. Let T be a maximally strongly consistent theory and T ⊢ ϕ ∨ ψ.
Then, either T ⊢ ϕ or T ⊢ ψ.
Proof. Proof is straightforward.
Now, the definition of a Henkin theory is given.
Definition 2.16. An L-theory T is Henkin if whenever T 0 ∀xϕ(x), there is
a constant symbol c ∈ L such that T 0 ϕ(c).
Theorem 2.17. Assume T is a strongly consistent L-theory. Then, there exist
an extension Lˆ of L and a maximally strongly consistent Henkin Lˆ-theory Tˆ
containing T .
Proof. Let L0 = L and T0 = T . Suppose that Ln and Tn are constructed such
that Tn is a strongly consistent Ln-theory containing T . Let F0 = Form(L0).
For n > 0, set Fn = Form(Ln) \ Form(Ln−1). Define
Ln+1 = Ln ∪ {cϕ(x),r,s : ϕ(x) ∈ Fn, r > s > 0}
and take a maximally strongly consistent Ln-theory Tˆn containing Tn. Take
Tn+1 = Tˆn ∪ {(r¯ → ∀xϕ(x)) ∨ (ϕ(cϕ(x),r,s)→ s¯) : ϕ(x) ∈ Fn, r > s > 0}.
Claim 1. Tn+1 is strongly consistent.
Proof of claim 1.
Suppose not. Therefore, Tn+1 ⊢ k¯ for some k > 0. So, there is a finite subset
Σ of {(r¯ → ∀xϕ(x)) ∨ (ϕ(cϕ(x),r,s) → s¯) : ϕ(x) ∈ Fn, r > s > 0} such that
Tˆn ∪ Σ ⊢ k¯. Take Σ to be minimal. For θϕ(x),r,s ∈ Σ, let Γ = Σ \ {θϕ(x),r,s}.
Now, by showing that Tˆn ∪ Γ ⊢ k¯, we get a contradiction.
Since Tˆn∪Γ∪{θϕ(x),r,s} ⊢ k¯, by the deduction theorem, Tˆn∪Γ ⊢ θϕ(x),r,s → k¯,
i.e.,
Tˆn ∪ Γ ⊢
(
(r¯ → ∀xϕ(x)) ∨ (ϕ(cϕ(x),r,s)→ s¯)
)
→ k¯.
Therefore, by Lemma 2.7(vii),
Tˆn ∪ Γ ⊢
(
r¯ → ∀xϕ(x)
)
→ k¯, (3)
and
Tˆn ∪ Γ ⊢
(
ϕ(cϕ(x),r,s)→ s¯
)
→ k¯. (4)
Since ⊢ s¯ →
(
ϕ(cϕ(x),r,s) → s¯
)
, (4) implies Tˆn ∪ Γ ⊢ s¯ → k¯. Now, since r > s,
by RGL2 and Lemma 2.7(v),
Tˆn ∪ Γ ⊢ r¯→ k¯. (5)
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As Tˆn ∪ Γ 0 k¯, it follows from (3) that Tˆn ∪ Γ 0 r¯ → ∀xϕ(x). But, since Tˆn is
a maximally strongly consistent Ln-theory and (r¯ → ∀xϕ(x)) ∈ Sent(Ln),
Tˆn ∪ Γ ⊢ ∀xϕ(x)→ r¯. (6)
On the other hand, by (4) and Lemma 2.7(vii),
Tˆn ∪ Γ ⊢ k¯ ∨ (s¯→ ϕ(cϕ(x),r,s)).
So, cϕ(x),r,s /∈ Ln implies that
Tˆn ∪ Γ ⊢ ∀x
(
k¯ ∨ (s¯→ ϕ(x))
)
.
Therefore, by G∀3,
Tˆn ∪ Γ ⊢ k¯ ∨ ∀x (s¯→ ϕ(x)).
Now, since Tˆn ∪ Γ 0 k¯ and Tˆn is maximally strongly consistent Ln-theory, by
Lemma 2.15, Tˆn ∪ Γ ⊢ ∀x (s¯→ ϕ(x)). Moreover, by G∀2,
Tˆn ∪ Γ ⊢ s¯→ ∀xϕ(x).
(6) and Lemma 2.7(v) imply that Tˆn ∪ Γ ⊢ s¯ → r¯. Furthermore, as r > s, by
RGL2 and (5),
Tˆn ∪ Γ ⊢ k¯,
a contradiction.
claim1
Now, using the above claim for each n ≥ 0, one may inductively define a lan-
guage Ln and a strongly consistent Ln-theory Tn. Let Lˆ =
⋃
n<ω Ln and Tˆ be
a maximally strongly consistent Lˆ-theory containing
⋃
n<ω Tn. We show that
Tˆ is also a Henkin Lˆ-theory.
Clearly, as
⋃
n<ω Tn is strongly consistent, Tˆ exists. To show that Tˆ is Henkin,
let Tˆ 0 ∀xϕ(x) for some ϕ(x) ∈ Form(Lˆ). Now, since Tˆ is maximally strongly
consistent there exists r > 0 such that Tˆ 0 r¯ → ∀xϕ(x). But, (r¯ → ∀xϕ(x)) ∨
(ϕ(cϕ(x),r,s)→ s¯) ∈ Tˆ implies Tˆ ⊢ ϕ(cϕ(x),r,s)→ s¯ and so, Tˆ 0 ϕ(cϕ(x),r,s).
The following technical lemma is needed for Theorem 2.19.
Lemma 2.18. Let T be an L-theory. Set
• S = {ψ ∈ Sent(L) : there exists rational numbers r, s > 0 such that T ⊢
(s¯→ ψ) ∧ (ψ → r¯)}.
• L′ = L∪{αψ, βψ : ψ ∈ S}∪{γ} where αψ , βψ and γ are some new nullary
predicate symbols.
• Tψ = T ∪ {αψ ⇒ ψ, ψ ⇒ βψ} ∪ {s¯ → αψ : T ⊢ s¯ ⇒ ψ} ∪ {βψ → r¯ : T ⊢
ψ ⇒ r¯}.
• T1 = T ∪ {ψ ⇒ γ} ∪ {γ → r¯ : r < 1}.
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• T ′ = T1 ∪
⋃
ψ∈S Tψ.
If T is strongly consistent then so is T ′.
Proof. We only show that Tψ is strongly consistent. If not, then there exist a
finite subset ∆ of T and k¯ such that,
∆ ∪ {αψ ⇒ ψ, ψ ⇒ βψ} ∪ {s¯i → αψ : T ⊢ s¯i ⇒ ψ, 1 ≤ i ≤ n}
∪ {βψ → r¯j : T ⊢ ψ ⇒ r¯j , 1 ≤ j ≤ m} ⊢ k¯.
We may suppose both sequences {si}ni=1 and {rj}
m
j=1 are increasing. So, we
have
T ⊢ (s¯1 ⇒ ψ) ∧ (ψ ⇒ r¯m) and r1 ≤ ... ≤ rm<s1 ≤ ... ≤ sn.
Now, using the substitution Lemma 2.6, one can replace αψ by s¯1 and βψ by
r¯m and conclude:
∆ ∪ {s¯1 ⇒ ψ, ψ ⇒ r¯m} ∪ {s¯i → s¯1 : T ⊢ s¯i ⇒ ψ, 1 ≤ i ≤ n}
∪ {r¯m → r¯j : T ⊢ ψ ⇒ r¯j , 1 ≤ j ≤ m} ⊢ k¯.
On the other hand,
T ⊢ (s¯1 ⇒ ψ) ∧ (ψ ⇒ r¯m),
⊢ (s¯i → s¯1), for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
⊢ (r¯m → r¯j), for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m.
Thus, T ⊢ k¯, a contradiction.
Theorem 2.19. Let Σ be a maximally strongly consistent L-theory and G be
the RGL-algebra of classes of Σ-equivalent sentences introduced in Lemma 2.8.
Then, there is a continuous order preserving map g from G into I (that is all
suprema and infima preserved by the map g).
Proof. For any a ∈ G, set
st(a) = inf{r ∈ [0, 1]Q : a ≤G [r¯]Σ} ∈ [0, 1].
Let 〈a〉G = {b ∈ G : st(b) = st(a)}. Note that if b ∈ 〈a〉G then, for any r > 0,
Σ ⊢ r¯→ a iff Σ ⊢ r¯ → b.
To construct g, for any a ∈ G, we define ga from 〈a〉G to
Ia = {x ∈ I : (st(a), 0) ≤ x ≤ (st(a), 1)}
and let g =
⋃
a∈G ga.
Lemma 2.18 shows that one may extend the language L so that for any [0¯]Σ <G
a, 〈a〉G has at least two distinct elements, and furthermore, for any rational
number 0 < r < 1, there are two distinct elements a, b ∈ 〈[r¯]Σ〉G such that
a <G [r¯]Σ <G b. Thus, since 〈a〉G is a countable set by the same way as [10,
Lemma 5.3.1], for any [0¯]Σ <G a, there is a continuous order preserving map ga
of 〈a〉G into Ia such that
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1) If 〈a〉G has minimum (resp. maximum) α, then ga(α) is the minimum
(resp. maximum) of Ia,
2) for each rational number r ∈ [0, 1], gr([r¯]Σ) = rˆ.
In the light of the above Lemma 2.18, (1) and (2) simultaneously hold.
The proof is completed, if we show that g =
⋃
a∈G ga is a continuous order
preserving function.
Linear completeness of Σ implies that whenever 〈a〉G < 〈b〉G , there is r > 0
such that a <G [r¯]Σ <G b and whence, g is an order preserving function. To
prove the continuity of g, let A ⊆ G and supA = α and inf A = β. We have
to verify that sup g(A) = g(α) and inf g(A) = g(β), respectively. We only show
that sup g(A) = g(α) and the other case is similar. The proof is divided in two
different cases:
a) α ∈ 〈a〉G for some a ∈ G, and furthermore, there is some e 6= α in A such
that e ∈ 〈a〉G . In this case, continuity of ga implies that
sup g(A) = sup{g(b) : b ∈ A} = sup{g(b) : b ∈ A ∩ 〈a〉G}
= sup{ga(b) : b ∈ A ∩ 〈a〉G} = ga
(
sup{b : b ∈ A ∩ 〈a〉G}
)
= ga(α).
b) α ∈ 〈a〉G and there is no element of A in 〈a〉G . Subsequently, we have two
subcases:
b1) g(α), sup g(A) ∈ Ia. Since b /∈ 〈a〉G for each b ∈ A, it follows α =
min〈a〉G . Thus, g(α) = ga(α) = min(Ia) by the condition (1) above.
On the other hand, as sup g(A) ∈ Ia, it implies sup g(A) = min(Ia).
Therefore, sup g(A) = g(α).
b2) g(α) ∈ Ia, but sup g(A) /∈ Ia. This means sup g(A) < g(α). So,
there is a rational number r < st(a) such that sup g(A) < rˆ < g(α).
Therefore, sup g(A) < g([r¯]Σ). But, this contradicts the fact that α
is the least upper bound of A.
Next, the completeness theorem is established for RGL∗.
Theorem 2.20. (Completeness of RGL∗) In RGL∗, any strongly consistent
theory is satisfiable.
Proof. Let T be a strongly consistent L-theory. By Theorem 2.17, there is a
first order language Lˆ containing L and a maximally strongly consistent Henkin
Lˆ-theory Σ containing T . Let G¯ be the RGL-algebra of classes of Σ-equivalent
sentences introduced in Lemma 2.8. Since Σ is linear complete, G is a linear
ordered set. Now, in the light of Theorem 2.19, there is a continuous order
preserving map from G into I. Therefore, one can define an L-structure M as
follows.
a) The universe of M is the set of all closed Lˆ-terms.
b) For each n-ary function symbol f , define fM :Mn →M as
fM(t1, ..., tn) = f(t1, ..., tn).
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c) For each n-ary predicate symbol P , define PM :Mn → I as
PM(t1, ..., tn) = g([P (t1, ..., tn)]Σ).
A straightforward induction on the complexity of formulas shows that ϕM =
g([ϕ]Σ) for any ϕ ∈ Sent(Lˆ). In particular, for any ϕ ∈ Σ, ϕM = 0ˆ. Since
T ⊆ Σ, it follows that M is a model of T and the proof is complete.
Corollary 2.21. (Compactness theorem for RGL∗) Every finitely satisfiable
L-theory is satisfiable.
Also, one may study the strong completeness with respect to the strong
entailment.
2.3 Completeness with respect to the strong entailment
In this subsection, we investigate the relationship between strong entailment
and deduction. First, we prove the weak completeness of RGL∗. A different
but similar proof can be found in [9, Theorem 4.7].
Lemma 2.22. (Weak completeness theorem) For every sentence ϕ, if |= ϕ then
⊢ ϕ.
Proof. Let 0 ϕ in RGL∗ and r¯1, . . . , r¯n ∈ Sub(ϕ). Let G(r1, ..., rn) be the
Go¨del logic enriched with finitely many nullary predicate r¯1, ..., r¯n introduced
in [10]. Note that any sentence which is derivable in G(r1, ..., rn) can also be
derived in RGL∗. The set Ax(r1, ..., rn) of book-keeping axioms of G(r1, ..., rn)
can also be viewed as an L ∪ {r¯1, ..., r¯n}-theory in first-order Go¨del logic. This
means that r¯1, ..., r¯n are treated as nullary predicates. Hence, Ax(r1, ..., rn) 0 ϕ
in (standard) first-order Go¨del logic. Now, on the basis of standard completeness
theorem of Go¨del logic, there is a countable structure M, whose truth values
take place in [0, 1] such that ϕM > 0. Note that for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, r¯i may not be
interpreted by ri. Let
X = {ψM(a¯) | ψ(x¯) ∈ Sub(ϕ), a¯ ∈Mn}.
Take α = max{r > 0 | r¯M = 0, r¯ ∈ Sub(ϕ)} ∪ {0¯}. Since X is countable there
is a continuous order-preserving map g : X → [α, 1]2 such that g(r¯) = rˆ, for
every r > α and g(0¯M) = αˆ. We construct an L-structure N as follows. Let the
universe of N as well as the interpretations of function and constant symbols
remain the same as the structureM. For every predicate symbol P and a¯ ∈M ,
define
PN (a¯) =
{
g(PM(a¯)) P (x¯) ∈ Sub(ϕ),
0ˆ o.w.
We claim that for every ψ(x¯) ∈ Sub(ϕ) and a¯ ∈Mn,
1. if ψM(a¯) > 0 then ψN (a¯) = g(ψM(a¯)) > αˆ, and
2. if ψM(a¯) = 0 then ψN (a¯) ≤ αˆ.
The claim can be proved by induction.
1. For atomic formulas, the connectives ∧, ∨, and the quantifier ∀, the in-
duction is routine.
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2. Let ψ(x¯) = ψ1(x¯)→ ψ2(x¯).
If (ψ1 → ψ2)M(a¯) > 0 then ψM1 (a¯) < ψ
M
2 (a¯) and ψ
M
2 (a¯) > 0.
• If ψM1 (a¯) = 0 then by induction hypotheses, ψ
N
1 (a¯) ≤ αˆ and ψ
N
2 (a¯) =
g(ψM2 (a¯)) > αˆ. Therefore, ψ
N
1 (a¯) < ψ
N
2 (a¯) and (ψ1 → ψ2)
N (a¯) =
ψN2 (a¯) > αˆ.
• If 0 < ψM1 (a¯) < ψ
M
2 (a¯) then αˆ < ψ
N
1 (a¯) = g(ψ
M
1 (a¯)) < ψ
N
2 (a¯) =
g(ψM2 (a¯)). So, (ψ1 → ψ2)
N (a¯) = ψN2 (a¯) > αˆ.
If (ψ1 → ψ2)M(a¯) = 0 then ψM1 (a¯) ≥ ψ
M
2 (a¯). Suppose on the contrary,
(ψ1 → ψ2)N (a¯) > αˆ. Then, ψN1 (a¯) < ψ
N
2 (a¯) and ψ
N
2 (a¯) > αˆ. This means
ψN2 (a¯) = g(ψ
M
2 (a¯)) > g(0) = αˆ. Now, since g is monotone ψ
M
2 (a¯) > 0.
On the other hand, ψM1 (a¯) ≥ ψ
M
2 (a¯) > 0 implies that αˆ < ψ
N
2 (a¯) =
g(ψM2 (a¯)) ≤ ψ
N
1 (a¯) = g(ψ
M
1 (a¯)), a contradiction.
3. Let ψ(x¯) = ∃y ψ1(y, x¯).
If (∃y ψ1(y, b¯))
M > 0 then infa∈M ψ
M
1 (a, b¯) > 0. This implies that
ψM1 (a, b¯) > 0 for every a ∈ M . So, by induction hypothesis, ψ
N
1 (a, b¯) =
g(ψM1 (a, b¯)) > αˆ for every a ∈M . By the continuity of g, we have
(∃y ψ1(y, b¯))
N = inf
a∈N
ψN1 (a, b¯)
= inf
a∈M
g(ψM1 (a, b¯))
= g( inf
a∈M
ψM1 (a, b¯)) > αˆ.
Now, suppose (∃y ψ1(y, b¯))M = 0. Then, infa∈M ψM1 (a, b¯) = 0.
• If there is an element a ∈ M such that ψM1 (a, b¯) = 0 then by induc-
tion hypothesis, ψN1 (a, b¯) ≤ αˆ. So, (∃y ψ1(y, b¯))
N = infa∈N ψ
N
1 (a, b¯) ≤
αˆ.
• If for every a ∈ M , ψM1 (a, b¯) > 0 then for every a ∈ N , ψ
N
1 (a, b¯) =
g(ψM1 (a, b¯)) > αˆ. Hence,
(∃y ψ1(x, b¯))
N = inf
a∈N
ψN1 (a, b¯)
= inf
a∈M
g(ψM1 (a, b¯))
= g( inf
a∈M
ψM1 (a, b¯)) = g(0) = αˆ.
The following theorem establishes some connections between the strong en-
tailment and deduction.
Theorem 2.23. Let Σ be an L-theory and ϕ be an L-sentence.
1) if Σ is finite then, Σ
s
|= ϕ iff Σ ⊢ ϕ.
2) Σ
s
|= ϕ if and only if Σ ⊢ n−1 → ϕ for all n ∈ N.
Proof. (1). Let Σ = {ϕ1, . . . , ϕn}. If {ϕ1, . . . , ϕn}
s
|= ϕ then for all L-structures
M,
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max{ϕM1 , . . . , ϕ
M
n } ≥ ϕ
M.
So, for all L-structuresM, (ϕ1∧· · ·∧ϕn)M ≥ ϕM and (ϕ1∧· · ·∧ϕn → ϕ)M = 0.
Therefore, |= ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕn → ϕ. By Lemma 2.22, ⊢ ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕn → ϕ. So, by
the deduction theorem, ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕn ⊢ ϕ. Hence, Σ ⊢ ϕ.
The other direction easily follows from the soundness theorem.
(2). We first show that whenever Σ
s
|= ϕ, for every n ∈ N, there is a finite subset
Σ0 of Σ such that Σ0
s
|= n−1 → ϕ.
Let Σ = {ϕi : i ∈ I} and n ∈ N. Since Σ
s
|= ϕ, it follows that for every L-
structureM, we have supi∈I ϕ
M
i ≥ ϕ
M. Extend the language L to L′ = L∪{γ}
where γ is a new nullary predicate symbol. Put
Σ′ = {γ ⇒ n−1, ϕ⇒ γ} ∪ {γ → ϕi : i ∈ I}.
We claim that Σ′ is not satisfiable. Otherwise, let M be an L′-structure which
models Σ′. So, γM > n̂−1, ϕM > γM and for every i ∈ I, γM ≥ ϕMi .
Then, γM ≥ supi∈I ϕ
M
i ≥ ϕ
M. But, this is a contradiction, since ϕM > γM.
Therefore, by the compactness theorem, there is a finite subset Σ′0 of Σ such
that the following theory
Σ′0 = {γ ⇒ n
−1, ϕ⇒ γ} ∪ {γ → θ : θ ∈ Σ0}
is not satisfiable. We claim that Σ0
s
|= n−1 → ϕ.
Fix an L-structure M. If ϕM ≤ n̂−1 then (n−1 → ϕ)M = 0ˆ and therefore,
maxθ∈Σ0 θ
M ≥ 0ˆ = (n−1 → ϕ)M. So, we may suppose that ϕM > n̂−1. We
show that maxθ∈Σ0 θ
M ≥ ϕM. If not, then ϕM > maxθ∈Σ0 θ
M. Choose α ∈ I
in such a way that
ϕM > α > maxθ∈Σ0 θ
M,
α > n̂−1.
Then, by interpreting the nullary predicate γ by α, we may get an L′ expansion
N of M which is a model of Σ′, a contradiction.
Whence, as Σ0 is finite, by (1) we have Σ0 ⊢ n−1 → ϕ. Hence, for any n ∈ N,
Σ ⊢ n−1 → ϕ.
In the following theorem an approximate version of entailment compactness
is established.
Theorem 2.24. Let T be an L-theory and ϕ be an L-sentence. T |= ϕ if and
only if for every n ∈ N, there is a finite subset Tn of T such that Tn |= n−1 → ϕ.
Proof. Let T |= ϕ. Suppose on the contrary that, there exists n ∈ N such that
for any finite subset S of T , S 2 n−1 → ϕ. Thus, for any finite subset S of T
there is an L-structure M of S such that M 2 n−1 → ϕ. So, M |= ϕ → n−1,
i.e., S ∪ {ϕ→ n−1} is satisfiable. But, S is an arbitrary finite subset of T and
so, T ∪{ϕ→ n−1} is finitely satisfiable. Now, the compactness theorem implies
that T ∪ {ϕ→ n−1} is satisfiable. But, this contradicts T |= ϕ.
Conversely, suppose that for any n ∈ N there is a finite subset Tn of T such
that Tn |= n−1 → ϕ. We want to show that T |= ϕ. Suppose not. Hence, there
exists an L-structure M of T such that M 2 ϕ. So, there is a natural number
n such that ϕM ≥ n̂−1. This means for any finite subset S of T , S 2 n−1 → ϕ,
a contradiction.
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Remark 2.25. Let u : [0, 1]2 → [0, 1]2 defined by u(x, y) = (1 − x, 1 − y) and
I∗ = [0, 1]2 \ {(1, r) : r < 1}. One may naturally use the function u to define an
I∗-interpretation Mu for the language L. Using this function one may translate
all semantical issues of RLG∗, e.g, satisfiability and (strong) entailment to the
fuzzy first-order rational Go¨del logic. Hence all the results given in this section
remain valid for the fuzzy first-order rational Go¨del logic.
3 Ultrametric Logic
In first-order classical logic the equality relation has the following properties,
(S1) ∀x (x = x),
(S2) ∀x∀y (x = y → y = x),
(S3) ∀x∀y∀z ((x = y ∧ y = z)→ x = z),
(E1) for all function symbol f , ∀x¯∀y¯
(
(x¯ = y¯)→ (f(x¯) = f(y¯))
)
,
(E2) for all predicate symbol P , ∀x¯∀y¯
(
(x¯ = y¯)→ (P (x¯)↔ P (y¯))
)
.
While (S1-S3) are called the similarity axioms, (E1,E2) are named the exten-
sionality axioms. The next lemma shows the meaning of the above axioms in
RGL∗.
Lemma 3.1. LetM be an L-structure and suppose ”d” is a distinguished binary
predicate symbol in L.
1) If dM satisfies the similarity axioms then dM defines an extended pseudo-
ultrametric on the universe ofM, i.e., dM :M2 → I satisfies the following
properties, for all a, b, c,∈M :
dM(a, a) = 0ˆ,
dM(a, b) = dM(b, a),
dM(a, b) ≤ max{dM(a, c), dM(b, c)}.
2) Moreover, if M satisfies the extensionality axioms then the interpreta-
tion of any function symbol f and any predicate symbol P is 1-Lipschitz,
respectively, i.e., for all a¯, b¯ ∈Mn,
dM(fM(a¯), fM(b¯)) ≤ dM(a¯, b¯),
dmax(P
M(a¯), PM(b¯)) ≤ dM(a¯, b¯).
Remark 3.2. For a given extended pseudo-ultrametric space (M,d :M2 → I),
one may define an extended pseudo-ultrametric dn(a¯, b¯) on the set of n-tuples
of Mn as
dn(a¯, b¯) = max{dM(ai, bi) : 1 ≤ i ≤ n}.
We may omit the subscript n if there is no danger of ambiguity.
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We are interested in obtaining an extended ultrametric instead of an ex-
tended pseudo-ultrametric. To this end, we need a weaker translation of the
extensionality axioms.
Following continuous first-order logic, we replace (E1,E2) by somewhat weaker
axioms, ensuring that the interpretation of all function and predicate symbols
are uniformly continuous, i.e., for any n ∈ N, there exist mP ,mf ∈ N such that
for all a¯, b¯ ∈M ,
1) if dM(a¯, b¯) < m̂−1f then d
M(fM(a¯), fM(b¯)) ≤ n̂−1,
2) if dM(a¯, b¯) < m̂−1P then dmax(P
M(a¯), PM(b¯)) ≤ n̂−1.
Definition 3.3. A first-order language L with a distinguished binary relation
”d” together with a set of modulus of uniform continuity functions {δe : N→ N :
e is either a function or predicate symbol } is called a continuous ultrametric
language.
From now on, assume L is a fixed continuous ultrametric language. Now, the
notion of L-structures is modified accordingly.
Definition 3.4. A continuous ultrametric L-pre-structure or simply an ultra-
metric L-pre-structure is an L-structure M with the following properties:
1. dM :M2 → I is an extended pseudo-ultrametric,
2. for every n-ary function symbol ”f”, fM : (Mn, dM)→ (M,dM) satisfies
the following condition for any n ∈ N and all a¯, b¯ ∈M ,
if dM(a¯, b¯) < ̂(δf (n))−1 then d
M(f(a¯), f(b¯)) < n̂−1,
3. for every n-ary predicate symbol ”P”, PM : (Mn, dM) → (I, dmax) satis-
fies the following condition for any n ∈ N and all a¯, b¯ ∈M ,
if dM(a¯, b¯) < ̂(δP (n))−1 then dmax(P
M(a¯), PM(b¯)) < n̂−1.
Remark 3.5. An extended pseudo-ultrametric d :M2 → I on the setM is called
an extended ultrametric, if d(a, b) = 0ˆ implies that a = b for any a, b ∈M .
Following continuous first-order logic [4], the next definition is established.
Definition 3.6. A continuous ultrametric L-structure or simply an ultrametric
L-structure is a ultrametric L-pre-structure M, where dM : M2 → I is an
extended ultrametric.
Lemma 3.7. Suppose M is an ultrametric L-pre-structure. Then, there exist
an ultrametric L-structure M0 and a function f : M → M0 such that for any
L-formula ϕ(x¯) and a¯ ∈Mn,
M |= ϕ(a¯) iff M0 |= ϕ(f(a¯)).
Proof. Define the equivalence relation ∼ as
a ∼ b iff dM(a, b) = 0ˆ.
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Denote the equivalence class of a ∈ M by [a]∼. Now, let M0 be the set of the
equivalence classes of ∼ in M . Define
dM0([a]∼, [b]∼) = d
M(a, b).
Then, (M0, d
M0) is an extended ultrametric space. Furthermore, for any pred-
icate and function symbols P and f set
PM0([a1]∼, ..., [anP ]∼) = P
M(a1, ..., anP ),
fM0([a1]∼, ..., [anf ]∼) = f
M(a1, ..., anf ).
The uniform continuity of the interpretation of predicate and function sym-
bols in M implies that the above definitions are well-defined. So, if predicate
and function symbols satisfy the uniform continuity axioms then we get an
L-structure M0.
Define f : M → M0 as f(a) = [a]∼. Obviously, ϕM0([a1]∼, ..., [an]∼) =
ϕM(a1, ..., an) for any L-formula ϕ(x¯) and a¯ ∈Mn. Whence, f is the desirable
function.
The axiom system of ultrametric logic consists of the axioms of RGL∗ to-
gether with the following axioms:
S1. ∀x (d(x, x)),
S2. ∀x∀y
(
d(x, y)→ d(y, x)
)
,
S3. ∀x∀y∀z
((
d(x, y) ∧ d(y, z)
)
→ d(x, z)
)
,
for any function symbol f , and any predicate symbol P and any natural number
n,
WE1. ∀x¯∀y¯
((
d(x¯, y¯)→ δf(n)
)
∨
(
n−1 → d(f(x¯), f(y¯))
))
,
WE2. ∀x¯∀y¯
((
d(x¯, y¯)→ δP (n)
)
∨
(
n−1 → (p(x¯)↔ p(y¯))
))
.
The inference rules are the same as RGL∗. The ultrametric logic is denoted by
UML.
Corollary 3.8. Any strongly consistent (resp. finitely satisfiable) theory is
satisfiable in UML.
4 Some Model Theory for Ultrametric Logic
In this section, some model theory for UML is developed. Using the machinery
developed here, the Robinson consistency theorem (Theorem 4.15) is proved. To
simplify the notation, by an L-structure we mean an ultrametric L-structure.
Definition 4.1. Let M and N be two L-structures.
1. M and N are elementary equivalent, denoted by M ≡ N , if ϕM = ϕN
for any ϕ ∈ Sent(L).
2. An embedding is a function j :M → N with the following properties. For
any function symbol f and predicate symbol P ,
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a) j
(
fM(a1, ..., anf )
)
= fN
(
j(a1), ..., j(anf )
)
, f ∈ L and a¯ ∈Mnf ,
b) PM(a1, ..., anP ) = P
N
(
j(a1), ..., j(anP )
)
, P ∈ L and a¯ ∈MnP .
It is easy to see that for every quantifier-free L-formula ϕ(x¯) and any
element a¯ ∈Mn,
(∗) ϕM(a1, ..., an) = ϕ
N
(
j(a1), ..., j(an)
)
.
Moreover, an embedding is an isometry, i.e., dM(a, b) = dN (j(a), j(b))
for any a, b,∈M . Therefore, j is injective.
3. The embedding j is elementary, if (∗) holds for any L-formula ϕ(x¯). In
this case, j is denoted by j :M →֒ N .
4. An isomorphism is a surjective elementary embedding.
Remark 4.2. The notion of substructure (resp. elementary substructure) is
a special case of the above definition, where M ⊆ N and the inclusion map is
embedding (resp. elementary embedding). In this case, we write M⊆ N (resp.
MN ).
Remark 4.3. As in the first-order logic, ThL(M) is the full theory of L-
structure M, that ThL(M) = {ϕ ∈ Sent(L,A) :M |= ϕ}.
While in first-order logic or even in continuous first-order logic the notion
of embedding (resp. elementary embedding) can be captured by means of the
notion of diagram (resp. elementary diagram), the lack of such feature for
ultrametric logic leads to the following definitions.
Definition 4.4. Let M be an L-structure, ϕ(x¯) ∈ Form(L) and a¯ ∈ M . The
truth degree of ϕM(a¯), stM(ϕ(a¯)), is defined by
inf{r ∈ [0, 1]Q :M |= r¯ → ϕ(a¯)} ∈ [0, 1].
Definition 4.5. Let M and N be two L-structures.
1. M and N are weakly elementary equivalent,M
w
≡ N , if stM(ϕ) = stN (ϕ)
for any L-sentence ϕ. Observe that if M
w
≡ N then for every two L-
sentences ϕ and ψ,
ϕM ≤ ψM iff ϕN ≤ ψN .
2. A function j :M → N is called a weak elementary L-embedding, denoted
by j :M
w
→֒
L
N , if it has the following properties,
a) j(fM(a1, ..., anf )) = f
N
(
j(a1), ..., j(anf )
)
, f ∈ L and a¯ ∈Mnf ,
b) stM(ϕ(a1, ..., an)) = stN
(
ϕ(j(a1), ..., j(an))
)
, ϕ(x¯) ∈ Form(L) and
a¯ ∈Mn.
3. Let L(M) = L ∪ {cm : m ∈ M}, where {cm}m∈M are some new constant
symbols. One can naturally interpret any cm inside the L-structure M by
m. So, any L-structureM can be viewed as an L(M)-structure. Now, the
weak elementary diagram of M is
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wediag
L
(M) = ThL(M)(M).
If there is no danger of confusion we may drop the subscript L and simply
write j :M
w
→֒ N and wediag(M).
Remark 4.6. Note that if j :M
w
→֒ N , then whenever j(a) = j(b) for a, b ∈M ,
we have dN (j(a), j(b)) = 0ˆ. Hence, dM(a, b) = 0ˆ which implies a = b. So, j is
an injective function.
The following lemma justifies why we call ThL(M)(M) a weak elementary
diagram, and why we need the additional concepts that are defined in Definition
4.5.
Lemma 4.7. Let M be an L-structure and N be an L(M)-structure such that
N |= wediag(M). Then, there is a weak elementary L-embedding j :M
w
→֒ N .
Proof. Clear.
Lemma 4.8. Let M, N and B be three countable L-structures and i :M
w
→֒ B
and j : N
w
→֒ B be weak elementary embeddings. Then, there is an L-structure
B′ with the same universe as B such that M
w
→֒ B′ and N →֒ B′.
Proof. Since j is a weak elementary embedding, the following two subsets of I
A = {ϕN (a1, ..., an) : ϕ(x1, ..., xn) ∈ Form(L), a1, ..., an ∈ N},
B = {ϕB(j(a1), ..., j(an)) : ϕ(x1, ..., xn) ∈ Form(L), a1, ..., an ∈ N}
satisfy the following properties:
1) ϕN (a1, ..., an) < ψ
N (b1, ..., bm) iff ϕ
B(j(a1), ..., j(an)) < ψ
B(j(b1), ..., j(bm)),
2) ϕN (a1, ..., an) = ψ
N (b1, ..., bm) iff ϕ
B(j(a1), ..., j(an)) = ψ
B(j(b1), ..., j(bm)).
By the same idea used in Theorem 2.19, one may find a continuous order pre-
serving function h : I→ I such that
1) h(rˆ) = rˆ,
2) h(ϕB(j(a1), ..., j(an))) = ϕ
N (a1, ..., an).
Now, define an L-structure B′ in such a way that the interpretations of constant
and function symbols are the same as B and for any predicate P , we have
PB
′
(b¯) = h(PB(b¯)). A simple induction shows that for any formula ϕ(x1, ..., xn)
and b1, ..., bn ∈ B, ϕ
B′(b¯) = h(ϕB(b¯)). Moreover, the function j : N → B′ is
an elementary embedding, while the function i :M→ B′ is a weak elementary
embedding.
The above proof highlights a special but important instant of the notion of
weak elementary equivalence.
Definition 4.9. LetM and M′ be two L-structures with the same universe M .
Suppose h : I→ I is an order preserving function. We say that M and M′ are
h-equivalent if ϕM
′
(a¯) = h(ϕM(a¯)). In this case, we write M≡h M′.
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Theorem 4.10. (Amalgamation property) Let B,D and E be three countable
L-structures. Suppose also, j : E
w
→֒ B and k : E
w
→֒ D are weak elementary
embeddings. Then, there are an L-structure G and embeddings j1 : B
w
→֒ G and
k1 : D →֒ G such that j1 ◦ j = k1 ◦ k.
Proof. Let LB = L(E)∪{cb : b ∈ B\j(E)}, LD = L(E)∪{cd : d ∈ D\j(E)} and
L′ = LB∪LD. Without loss of generality, we may assume that LB∩LD = L(E).
One can naturally interpret the new constants ce and cb for e ∈ E and b ∈ B
inside the L-structure B by j(e) and b, respectively. Also, B can be considered as
an LB-structure. We want to show that wediag(B)∪wediag(D) is a satisfiable
L′-theory.
For a given ϕ(ce1 , ..., cen , cb1 , ..., cbm) ∈ wediag(B), we have B |= ∃x¯ϕ(ce1 , ..., cen , x¯).
So, B |= ∃x¯ϕ(j(e1), ..., j(en), x¯). Moreover, since j : E
w
→֒ B and k : E
w
→֒ D, it
follows that E |= ∃x¯ϕ(e1, ..., en, x¯) and therefore, D |= ∃x¯ϕ(k(e1), ..., k(en), x¯),
i.e., inf d¯∈D ϕ
D(k(e1), ..., d¯) = 0ˆ. Hence, for any rational number 0 < r ≤ 1,
there exists d¯r ∈ D such that ϕD(k(e1), ..., d¯r) ≤ rˆ. Thus, the following set
wediag(D) ∪ {r¯→ ϕ(ce1 , ..., cen , cb1 , ..., cbm) : 0 < r ≤ 1}
is finitely satisfiable. Therefore, by the Lemma 2.13
wediag(D) ∪ {ϕ(ce1 , ..., cen , cb1 , ..., cbm)}
is strongly consistent. This leads us to show that wediag(B) ∪ wediag(D) is
satisfiable.
Now, any model G |= wediag(B) ∪ wediag(D) gives two weak elementary
embeddings j1 : B
w
→֒ G and k1 : D
w
→֒ G such that j1 ◦ j = k1 ◦ k. Furthermore,
by Lemma 4.8, k1 can be assumed to be an elementary embedding.
Below, the notion of direct limit of a family of sets and functions is de-
fined and then, using this concept, the notion of pseudo-direct limit of a weak
elementary chain of L-structures is introduced.
Definition 4.11. Let (Mi)i∈N be a family of pairwise disjoint sets. Suppose also
(fi,j :Mi →Mj)i≤j∈N is a family of functions. Call F = {(Mi)i∈N, (fi,j)i≤j∈N}
a direct system, if the following properties hold:
fi,i = idMi for any i ∈ N,
fi,j = fk,j ◦ fi,k for any i ≤ k ≤ j ∈ N.
For any direct system F = {(Mi)i∈N, (fi,j)i≤j∈N}, define an equivalence relation
≡
F
on M∞ =
⋃
i∈NMi as follows. For any a ∈Mi and b ∈Mj ,
a ≡F b iff there exists k ≥ i, j such that fi,k(a) = fj,k(b).
The equivalence classes of ≡
F
is denoted by [a]
F
. The set of all equivalence
classes of ≡
F
is also denoted by limFMi.
It is customary to call limF Mi the direct limit of the direct system F .
Definition 4.12. Suppose that (Mi)i∈N is a family of L-structures and (fi,j :
Mi
w
→֒ Mj)i≤j∈N is a family of weak elementary embeddings. We call F =
{Mi, fi,j} a weak direct system of L-structures if F = {(Mi)i∈N, (fi,j)i≤j∈N} is
a direct system.
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Lemma 4.13. (Union of chain) Let F = {Mi, fi,j} be a weak direct system
of L-structures. There exist an L-structure M∞ whose underlying universe is
limF Mi and a family {hi :Mi
w
→֒ M∞}i∈N of weak elementary embeddings such
that hj ◦ fi,j = hi for any i ≤ j ∈ N.
Proof. For any i ∈ N, let Ci = {cm : m ∈Mi} be a set of new constant symbols
and suppose further, that (Ci)i∈N are pairwise disjoint. Let Ln = L ∪
⋃n
i=1 Ci
and L∞ = L ∪
⋃∞
i=1 Ci. Also, for any i ≤ j ∈ N, the function f˜i,j : Ci → Cj is
defined by f˜i,j(cm) = cfi,j(m).
For every i ∈ N, set
Γi = {ϕ(cm1 , . . . , cmn) : ϕ(m1, . . . ,mn) ∈ wediag(Mi)},
∆i = {d(cm, f˜i,j(cm)) : i ≤ j ∈ N, cm ∈ Ci}.
Also, for every L∞-formula ϕ(x, c¯), take nϕ to be the least natural number such
that ϕ(x, c¯) is an Lnϕ-formula and put
ϕ˜(x, c¯) = ϕ(x, f˜i1,nϕ(cmi1 ), ..., cmnϕ ),
where c¯ = (cmi1 , ..., cmnϕ ) and i1 ≤ ... ≤ nϕ. For any i ∈ N, let
Si = {∀xϕ(x, c¯) : ϕ(x, c¯) ∈ Form(Li) and ∀x ϕ˜(x, c¯) ∈ Γnϕ}.
Note that if ∀xϕ(x, c¯) ∈ Si then nϕ ≤ i. In the sequel, we show that
Σ =
∞⋃
i=1
Γi ∪
∞⋃
i=1
∆i ∪
∞⋃
i=1
Si
is a satisfiable Henkin L∞-theory and has a model M with the universe M =
limF˜ Ci, where F˜ = {(Ci)i∈N, (f˜i,j)i≤j∈N}.
To show that Σ is satisfiable, for any n ∈ N, consider the Ln-theory
Σn =
n⋃
i=1
Γi ∪
n⋃
i=1
∆i ∪
n⋃
i=1
Si.
Let M̂n be the expansion of the L-structure Mn to an Ln-structure such that
cM̂nm = fi,n(m) for any cm ∈ Ci, i ≤ n. We claim that M̂n |= d(cm, f˜i,n(cm)).
To see this let m′ = fi,n(m). Since for any cm ∈ Ci, fi,n(m) ∈ Cn, we have
(f˜i,n(cm))
M̂n = cM̂nm′ = fn,n(m
′) = fn,n(fi,n(m)) = fi,n(m).
So, M̂n |= ∆i for any i ≤ n.
Furthermore, for any n ≥ nϕ whenever ∀xϕ(x, c¯) ∈
⋃n
i=1 Si, ∀x ϕ˜(x, c¯) ∈ Γnϕ .
Hence, Mnϕ |= ∀x ϕ˜(x, c¯). This implies M̂n |= ∀xϕ(x, c¯) and M̂n |= Σn. So,
Σn is satisfiable and by the compactness theorem, Σ is satisfiable.
Secondly, to verify that Σ is Henkin, let Σ 0 ∀xϕ(x, c¯). In particular, ∀xϕ(x, c¯) /∈
Σ. So, ∀x ϕ˜(x, c¯) /∈ Γnϕ and therefore,
(
∀x ϕ˜(x, c¯)
)Mnϕ > 0ˆ. This means that
there is a rational number r > 0 such that
(
∀x ϕ˜(x, c¯)
)Mnϕ > rˆ. Thus, there
exists d ∈ Mnϕ such that
(
ϕ˜(cd, c¯)
)Mnϕ ≥ rˆ. So, (ϕ˜(cd, c¯) → r¯)Mnϕ = 0ˆ, that
is
(
ϕ(cd, c¯)→ r¯
)M̂nϕ = 0ˆ. (7)
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Hence, Σ 0 ϕ(cd, c¯). If not, then for some n ≥ nϕ, Σn ⊢ ϕ(cd, c¯). Thus, by
soundness Σn |= ϕ(cd, c¯). Now, since M̂n |= Σn it follows that ϕM̂n(cd, c¯) = 0ˆ.
But, this contradicts with (7).
Take an L∞-theory Σ′ to be a maximally linear complete extension of Σ. This
extension remains Henkin. If Σ′ 0 ∀x ϕ(x, cm1 , . . . , cmn) then Σ 0 ∀x ϕ(x, cm1 , . . . , cmn).
Now, as Σ is Henkin, by a similar argument used in the above paragraph there
exist a constant c and a rational number r > 0 such that ϕ(c, cm1 , . . . , cmn)→
r¯ ∈ Σ. Thus, Σ′ ⊢ ϕ(c, cm1 , . . . , cmn)→ r¯, that is Σ
′ 0 ϕ(c, cm1 , . . . , cmn).
The method used in the proof of the completeness theorem implies that there is
an L∞-structure M whose universe is the interpretation of the set of constant
symbols ∪i∈NCi. One can easily see thatM = limFMi. And, moreover, for any
i ∈ N, the function hi :Mi
w
→֒ M defined by hi(m) = cMm is a weak elementary
embedding.
Remark 4.14. On the basis of the above lemma, call {M∞, (hi : Mi
w
→֒
M∞)i∈N} a pseudo-direct limit, since the proof does not guarantee the unique-
ness of the desired structure. Hence, it may be easily seen that if M∞ and
N∞ are two pseudo-direct limit of a direct system, then M∞ ≡h N∞ for some
h : I→ I.
Theorem 4.15. (Robinson consistency theorem) Let L, L1 and L2 be three
ultrametric languages such that L = L1 ∩ L2. Suppose for i = 1, 2, Ti is a
satisfiable Li-theory, both including a linear complete L-theory and T . Then,
T1 ∪ T2 is satisfiable L1 ∪ L2-theory.
Proof. Sine T1 and T2 are satisfiable theories there are an L1-structureM0 |= T1
and an L2-structure N0 |= T2. Since T is linear complete, by a similar argu-
ment used in the amalgamation property, one may show that wediag
L
(M0) ∪
wediag
L2
(N0) is satisfiable. So, by Lemma 4.8, there exists an L2-structure
N1 |= T2 together with some elementary L-embedding f0 : M0 →֒L N1 and
weak elementary L2-embedding g0,1 : N0
w
→֒
L2
N1.
N1 can be naturally viewed as an L2(M0)-structure where cm is interpreted
by f0(m), for any m ∈M0. So, for any L(M0)-sentence ϕ(cm1 , ..., cmi), we have
M0 |= ϕ(cm1 , ..., cmi) iff N1 |= ϕ(cm1 , ..., cmi).
Thus, both M0 and N1 are models of the same linear complete L(M0)-theory,
Th
L(M0)
(M0). Hence, a similar argument gives an L1-structure M1 |= T1, an
elementary L-embedding g1 : N1 →֒L M1 and a weak elementary L1-embedding
f0,1 :M0
w
→֒
L1
M1 such that g1 ◦ f0 = f0,1.
By continuing this method, we get the following diagram shown in Figure 1,
in which fi,i+1 : Mi
w
→֒
L1
Mi+1 and gi,i+1 : Ni
w
→֒
L2
Ni+1 are weak elementary
embeddings.
M0
w
→֒ M1
w
→֒ . . .
w
→֒ Mi
w
→֒ Mi+1
w
→֒ . . .
f0ց ↑g1 f1ց . . . ↑gi fiց ↑gi+1
fi+1ց . . .
N0
w
→֒ N1
w
→֒ . . .
w
→֒ Ni
w
→֒ Ni+1
w
→֒ . . .
Figure 1.
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Also, fi : Mi →֒L Ni+1 and gi : Ni →֒L Mi are elementary embeddings.
Furthermore,
(∗)
{
gi+1(fi(a)) = fi,i+1(a) for any a ∈Mi,
fi(gi(b)) = gi,i+1(b) for any b ∈ Ni.
One could construct the above diagram in such a way that for i 6= j,Mi∩Mj = ∅
(resp. Ni∩Nj = ∅). For i ≤ j, define fi,j :Mi
w
→֒
L1
Mj (resp. gi,j : Ni
w
→֒
L2
Nj)
so that F = {(Mi)i∈N, (fi,j)i≤j∈N} (resp. G = {(Ni)i∈N, (gi,j)i≤j∈N}) forms a
direct system.
Now, take pseudo-direct limits {M∞, (hi : Mi
w
→֒ M∞)i∈N} and {N∞, (ki :
Ni
w
→֒ N∞)i∈N} whose underlying sets are limFMi and limG Ni, respectively.
Define H : M∞ → N∞ by H([a]F) = [fi(a)]G , for a ∈ Mi. By (∗), the
function H is well-defined. To see that H is surjective, let [b]G ∈ N . By the
construction of N , there is j ∈ N such that b ∈ Nj. Set b′ = gj,j+1(b) and
a = gj+1(b
′). Then, we have H([a]F ) = [fj+1(a)]G . This means
fj+1(a) = fj+1(gj+1(b
′)) = gj+1,j+2(b
′) = gj+1,j+2(gj,j+1(b)) = gj,j+2(b).
So, fj+1(a) ≡G b and therefore, H([a]F ) = [b]G .
Moreover, for every L-formula ϕ(x¯) and [a]F ∈M∞, ϕM∞([a]F ) ≈ ϕN∞(H([a]F)),
since
ϕM∞([a]F) ≈ ϕMn(a) = ϕNn+1(fn(a)) ≈ ϕN∞(H([a]F )).
Therefore, for some h : I → I, we replace N∞ by another L2-structure N such
that N ≡h N∞ and ϕN (H([a]F )) = h(ϕN∞(H([a]F )) = ϕM∞([a]F ). Moreover,
for x, y ∈M∞, dM∞(x, y) = dN (H(x), H(y)). So, H is one to one.
Therefore, H is an L-isomorphism of M∞ onto N . Hence, there is an
ultrametric L1 ∪ L2-structure P such that P|L1 = M∞ and P|L2 ∼= N . Thus,
P |= T1 ∪ T2.
Remark 4.16. The translation given in Remark 2.25 can be easily applied to the
present context to show that the Robinson joint consistency theorem (Theorem
4.15) holds for (fuzzy) first-order rational Go¨del logic with equality.
5 Future Works
One should further develop the ultrametric logic to make it more accessible for
axiomatizing interesting mathematical structures such as valued fields and p-
adic fields. To this end, one may consider a more general value space and perhaps
some additional logical connectives. Any possible approach should allow us to
extend the basic results such as completeness and compactness theorems even
for uncountable languages. Therefore, the extended semantic should also include
”uncountable” structures.
Another interesting topic of research is to study the Robinson joint consis-
tency theorem for first-order (rational) Go¨del logic.
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